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Pure mathematics aims to present logically consistent systems of thought. 
Each of these systems of thought starts from clearly stated premises 
(axioms) which for the system on hand are just postulated without 
further justification. 
The rigour of the logical treatment expressed in the title implies that 
the result is definite as to the set of conclusions reached, but this is only 
the case as long as one is dealing with cla,ssical, rigorozcs logic, which is 
the attitude that was taken by the mathematician HILBERT. 1) 
Given that the system is built up by one special person, one further 
1) The term rigorous logic is proposed in the present article for the logic that 
aims at definite, unambiguous conclusions from clearly stated premises, as the 
term itself indicates. It seems preferable to the term “classical logic” which suggests 
a historical origin rather than a definite procedure. 
Rigorous logic is mainly based on 1. the rule of identity: “A is A”, 2. the rule 
of contradiction, i.e.: the statements “A is B” and “A is not-B” cannot both be 
true, and 3. the principle of the excluded third, which allows no more than these two 
alternative possibilities. As was pointed out, its method is to postulate certain 
premises, i.e. axioms, that lead to theorems, in particular to those of puye ,mathematics. 
In a previous publication (H. Zanstra, Methodology and Science, Vol. 2, p. 140, 1969, 
Section 6) this method of pure mathematics was called “speculation without facts”. 
A fundamentally different road was followed by the mathematician and 
philosopher L. E. J. BROUWER. 
It is that of intuition&m in which no axioms are postulated but that “recognizes 
mathematics as an autonomic interior constructional activity”. As a consequence 
of this, the criteria true and false in logic are replaced by the two different criteria 
provable and refutable respectively. And so in some cases it turns out that it is 
not possible to judge between the two alternative possibilities offered by the 
principle 3 of the excluded third, and it is in this sense this principle is then not 
accepted. We have no longer pure mathematics, because it has no axioms. And 
also, we have no longer rigorous logic, since it leaves room for alternatives. It 
is not further dealt with in the present article. The reader may be referred to: 
L. E. J. BROUWER, “The effect of intuitionism on classical algebra of logic”; 
Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, Vol. 57, p, 113 to 116 (195456) for a 
concise treatment. 
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grants, be it provisionally and subject to revision in a future more refined 
treatment, that he makes no mistakes or slips in his thinking. 
In the same way, a number of persons, each for himself, may have 
discovered some mathematical theorems. 
But the pursuit of their science by a number of mathematicians working 
in cooperation requires an additional discussion, since the situation is quite 
different from the case of a large number of individual isolated researchers 
working each one for himself. 
In order that such individual discoveries are to become common property, 
these various persons first have to communicate, interchanging their 
findings in some way, usually by speech, or gestures, or through the 
medium of writing or print, as messages sent and received. And for such 
communications to be possible at all, each of these persons finds it necessary 
to assume that behind every other (sound- and gestures-producing) body 
somewhat l&e his own, there is a mind somewhat like his own that observes, 
thinks and acts in the way he knows that his own mind does. Thus he 
concludes, from this rather vague analogy, that other minds exist besides 
his own 1) by the consideration: 1. I lcnow that my mind exists and that 
it is accompanied by a body; 2. I know that there are other bodies similar 
to my own in their properties; 3. and so I conclude by analogy that every 
other body is accompanied by a (for me hypothetical) mind. 
Each person, each individual mathematician by himself, thus can only 
become aware indirectly, and therefore hypothetically, of the existence of 
other mathematical minds and of their accomplishments of which he can 
only make an indirect use. The only facts of experiences and accomplish- 
ments he is directly and so with certainty aware of are those of his mind 
in its present state. And rigorous logic can discuss but never add to this 
body of facts and so never lead to the experiences and accomplishments 
of other minds and the existence of such minds. 
That the so-called “conclusion from analogy” is a logically doubtful 
procedure is convincingly shown from another example : 1. gold, iron and 
copper are metals ; 2. gold iron and copper are good conductors ; 3. therefore 
by analogy every metal is a good conductor. Clearly this reasoning does 
not belong to rigorous logic that only leads to the conclusion: some metals 
are good condu&ors, in particular gold, iron and copper. And so one 
cannot go with certainty beyond the factual premises 1 and 2. 
And so, returning to the hypothetical nature of other minds, the 
community of mathematicians as such must largely give up the hope for 
a logically rigorous treatment of the results of their science and admit 
that, for communal use of these results, logical rigour has largely broken 
1) Cf. H. ZANSTRA, “The Construction of Reality” (Pergamon Press, Oxford 1962), 
Chapter 2, pp. 55, 56, where use is made of the principle of indzcction or generalization, 
which is closely allied to this analogy reasoning. In fact, the now following words 
in the text can also be looked upon as a generalization from one known case to 
many other cases. 
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down since it has been supplemented, in cases involving more than one 
person, by the very vague principle of analogy, which may produce results 
that claim far more than rigorous logic allows, so that no conscientious 
pure mathematician working all by himself would permit it in any of 
his proofs. 
In fact, the perfect mathematical thinker who strives after logical rigour 
must for his work ignore the existence of his fellow beings, especially of 
his colleagues ; and so he ought to take for this purpose the attitude of 
the solip& defined as the person who would only assert the existence 
of his own mind and deny that of other minds. 
One recalls the well-known demonstration that solipsism cannot be 
refuted with certainty, since one cannot rule out the (be it very remote) 
possibility that life could be a well-regulated dream. This tallies with 
the above result that the existence of other minds cannot be proved with 
certainty, for the reason that such certainty would require the use of 
rigorous logic only. 
The position of logical rigour becomes indeed rather precarious where 
any communication of results is involved. The reader of a mathematical 
publication not written by himself cannot be entirely certain of the 
existence of the author’s mind. An author who writes a paper of pure 
mathematics, containing for example the logically rigorous proof of the 
“existence” of the solution of a differential equation, cannot give an 
equally rigorous proof for the existence of the minds of the Editor and 
his prospective readers- and the Editor, though he may be a famous 
pure mathematician, is unable to provide a logically rigorous proof for 
the existence of the minds of author and subscribers. 
All this seems to point towards the contrast between solitary work and 
communication of results as a worth-while subject for discussion. 
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